Abstract-We view the 'packet-switching problem' (from N inputs towards N outputs) from the perspective of game theory and we prove that, if the rates of flows are weighed then 'weighed max-min fair service rates' are the unique Nash equilibrium point of a natural strategic game in which throughput is granted on a 'least-demanding first-served' principle. We prove that a crossbar switching device with suitably randomized schedulers converges to this equilibrium point without pre-computing it.
INTRODUCTION
In the 'network-switching problem' data packets from N sources are forwarded through a single node towards N destinations creating N × N flows of data. A switching device in this node has to be assigned the task of handling the relevant traffic control. Suppose that each flow of data f from a source to a destination is assigned a weight w f by which we weigh its rate of service r f . The question is: on what principle(s) should our device operate? If the utility given to f is defined as r f /w f , what service rates should be given to the flows in order to achieve 'fairness', i.e., to equalize utilities as far as possible? And how can we be convinced that a specific device performs as desired?
On this question various active themes of research converge, and among a quite extensive literature various interesting starting points, more closely related to this work, are [1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11] . In an attempt to face the aforementioned issue it has been proposed that the rates of service for the N × N flows should be granted according to the 'weighted max-min fairness' (WMMF) principle [1, 2, 3, 10] : the rate granted to each flow is 'maximized' in the sense that it cannot be further increased unless the rate of some other flow receiving equal or less utility is decreased. However reasonable one may consider the WMMF-rates to be, they do raise a reverse engineering issue: a solution is suggested (a switching fabric or a relevant algorithm), yet we are seemingly lacking a rigorous definition of the problem it solves-a situation quite suggestive of a fiercely advancing technological era. (This state of affairs is met again: see [12] about the TCP/IP protocol.)
In this work we offer such a problem: Following a game theory approach, we suggest to let the flows decide the utility they will get. More specifically we define a natural auction game which grants utilities to flows according to a 'leastdemanding first-served' principle and prove that (a) this game has a unique Nash equilibrium which moreover corresponds to the 'WMMF' principle; (b) this equilibrium can be attained by at least one implementable device (here a crossbar switch with randomized schedulers). Thus we are able to answer on firm foundational ground at least a pair of crucial issues: (a) Which is the problem and which is its solution; and (b) that some implementable device does indeed offer this solution.
Notice (a) that the 'least-demanding first-served' principle applied is a quite reasonable principle for allocating a common resource (here: throughput); and (b) that this principle is compatible with the, seemingly forthcoming, 'pay-more getmore' principle: a flow f can simply 'pay' for a higher weight w f . The reader might want to compare our result with [13] where it is shown that if users are allowed to select their 'priorities' by paying a higher cost for a higher priority, then in a network supporting a continuum of priorities, a weighted max-min fair allocation (with suitably defined weights) is, again, achieved as a Nash equilibrium. Our result complements [13] (since we deal with how given weights should be interpreted), yet we should indicate that the game we consider here is defined differently from that of [13] .
Since WMMF is an already widely accepted principle, our results should not be interpreted simply as arguments in favor of WMMF, but mainly as a further analysis of its properties.
In Section II we review the 'weighted max-min fairness' idea. In Section III we present a switching game and prove that its unique Nash equilibrium coincides with 'weighted max-min fairness'. In Section IV we prove that a crossbar switching device with suitably randomized schedulers indeed attains the afore-mentioned Nash equilibrium. Section V is an epilogue.
II. A 'FAIR' SOLUTION FOR THE SWITCHING PROBLEM
A. An abstract switching device ' or not-initially none of the rows or columns is fixed-and at each round we consider only non-fixed rows or columns. An element (i, j) is said to be fixed if either row i or column j is fixed. For each row i let F i,0 denote the sum of the rates r i,j assigned to fixed elements along i, and let W i,0 denote the sum of the weights of the non-fixed elements along i. Analogously, for each column j. The WMMF-algorithm is:
For non-fixed columns κ j ← (1−F 0,j )/W 0,j Find i with min ρ i among non-fixed rows Find j with min κ j among non-fixed columns
Until all elements have been fixed For all (i,j) { set r i,j to u i,j ⋅ w i,j }.
Another view of the WMMF algorithm is the following: Given w, a pair of matrices can be defined by p i,j = w i,j /R i (w) and q i,j = w i,j /C j (w), i, j = 1, ..., N. In such a pair (p, q) a majorized column j is one such that p i,j ≥ q i,j for all rows i. Similarly a majorized row i is one such that q i,j ≥ p i,j for all columns j. In any such pair of matrices, (p, q), at least one majorized row or column will always exist: Fact 1: The WMMF-algorithm returns a matrix r of rates of service for which the following three hold: (a) r is a doubly stochastic matrix; (b) the utility matrix u is in max-min form; (c) r majorizes the matrix f = [min{p i,j , q i,j }], where
The converse is also true.
III. NETWORK SWITCHING AS A STRATEGIC GAME

A. A 'throughput game' and its Nash equilibria
We shall view the switching problem as a strategic game. Our game can be supposed to be non-cooperative simply because the breathtaking speed at which switching fabrics are able and expected to be operated, renders any 'cooperation' a prohibitively time-consuming luxury.
Let us recall the notion of a (strategic) game [14] (the highest the weight, the highest its 'priority'); (b) The strategy of each player (i, j) is a positive real number, U i, j ∈ R, (to be interpreted as the required utility, expressing that flow (i, j) 'requires' a rate of service equal to U i, j ⋅ w i, j ). Thus a strategy profile is an N × N matrix of required utilities U; (c) the game is played as follows: for each input i, the required utilities U i, j , j = 1, ..., N, are examined in increasing order and are granted a tentative input rate P i, j = U i, j ⋅ w i, j as long as the total rate granted for input i remains ≤ 1. Flows for which the remaining input rate is not sufficient to cover what they require receive zero input rate P i, j = 0. Symmetrically for each output j a tentative output rate Q i, j = U i, j ⋅ w i, j is granted. The gain for each (i, j), is defined by: gain (i, j) (U) = g i, j = min(P i, j , Q i, j ).
We characterize the Nash-equilibria of the game of Def. 2: Proof: Necessity is proved as follows: (a) The proof has two steps: (1) If in matrix g for some i, j we have R i (g) < 1 and C j (g) < 1 then we examine two cases: Case 1.1: If g i, j = 0 then flow (i, j) can set (possibly reducing) its strategy U i, j to a sufficiently small value δ > 0 so as to be served before other flows and thus be granted an amount δ of both input and output rate. So (i, j) can unilaterally increase its payoff from 0 to δ, therefore strategy profile U is not a Nash equilibrium point; Case 1.2: If g i, j > 0 then flow (i, j) has received the utility (thus rate also) it has required, and since by our hypothesis the rate for input i and the rate for output j have not been exhausted, flow (i, j) can alter its strategy U i, j increasing it by a sufficiently small value δ > 0 so as to be still served (perhaps as the last one, either in row i or column j). Both input and output tentative rates (P i, j , Q i, j ) will be increased thus securing greater payoff. So again U is not Nash. (b) Let u i, j = g i, j / w i, j be the granted utilities and suppose that for some i, j and k, l the following two hold: u i, j < u i,l and u i, j < u k, j , i.e., u i, j is not the maximum either in the i-row or in the j-column. But in this case a sufficiently small increase in (i, j)'s strategy U i, j can be granted (both for the input and output rates) because (i, j) cannot be the last served flow either in row i (since flow (i, l) has been granted a strictly greater rate) or in column j (since flow (k, j) has been granted a strictly greater rate). So (i, j) can unilaterally increase its payoff, therefore strategy profile U is not Nash.
(c) Let g i, j < min{w i,j /R i (w), w i,j /C j (w)} for some i, j. Since by (a) above for all i = 1, ..., N we have R i (g) = 1 and for all j = 1, ..., N, we have C j (g) = 1, there must exist k, l so that g i, l > w i,l /R i (w) and g k, j > w k,j /C j (w). So granted rates g i, l and g k, j are both greater than g i, j ; yet by (b) this cannot happen.
Sufficiency also holds: Let g i, j satisfy all three conditions of Theorem 3. Then the strategy profile U = [ g i, j / w i, j ], i, j = 1, ..., N, is a Nash equilibrium point: By (c) all flows are granted a non-zero rate; by (b) they are the last served either in their row or column; finally, by (a) they exhaust either all the remaining input or all the remaining output rate. Thus no flow can unilaterally increase its payoff since: (1) decreasing its requirement ('strategy') does not help because it has already been granted what it requires; (2) increasing its requirement also does not help because it will not be served earlier, while it already exhausts either all input / output rate available to it.
By Fact 1 and Theorem 3, our game has a unique Nash equilibrium point: the granted rates equal the WMMF-rates.
B. The game approach: a short informal discussion
The following two issues might be of interest to the reader: The first issue is: In an actually played game shouldn't everyone involved be aware of it? We consider this issue as a delicate one: On the one hand the answer is 'no': As evolutionary game theory has revealed [14, 15] game theory can explain phenomena involving very simple organisms in which no rationality or even awareness is observed. On the other hand awareness is not something we 'begin-with', but something we 'become-of'. After all, history has reserved a very distinctive role for scientific research in this latter process... The second issue is the difference between the 'fairness' and the 'game' approach: In the latter case the designer observes the strategic game users are indeedknowingly of unknowingly-playing, computes its equilibrium points, and (possibly) claims: «This is the game you are involved in, this is provably the best each one of you can obtain from it, however selfishly each of you may act, and here is a device that obtains the same instead of you». Notice that instead of discussions about what is fair, or what could be a reasonable approximation to it, an exact optimum is offered. We see no guarantee that the two approaches will always coincide-as it happens in our case.
IV. A RANDOMIZED SWITCH CONVERGING TO NASH
Notice that, with a device cycle of just a few nano-seconds, even computing the WMMF-rates by running the algorithm of Section II.B is prohibitively time and hardware consuming. Instead we shall show (inspired by [2, 3] ) that a suitably randomized device can converge to the WMMF-rates without pre-computing them. An attractive architecture for such a device is the 'crossbar switch' (implementable easily and cheaply on-chip [2, 16] At discrete time-steps our buffer is (independently of its state and of other buffers) probed for input with probability p and if it is not full it receives a packet (otherwise the 'chance is lost'). At the same step our buffer is similarly probed for output with probability q. We define the service-rate function s(⋅,⋅) as follows:
s( p, q) = the rate of service achieved by our buffer if it is probed for input (resp. output) with probability p (resp. q). (1) Let e( p, q) be the probability that the buffer will be empty, and let f ( p, q) be the probability that it will be full. A packet will be received from input with probability p (1−f ( p, q) ) and will be delivered to output with probability (1−e( p, q)) q. These expressions must be equal to the service rate s( p, q) achieved by this buffer, so the following holds: 
If at row i we are probing buffer (i, j) for input with probability p i, j then at each time-step we are 'visiting (at least once)' this buffer with an actual probability , i j p no less than p i, j , since it may happen to probe (i, j) on our first probe or after some other buffer. Similarly we are output-probing (i, j) with probability , i j q ≥ q i, j . Thus the service rate of (i, j) will actually be , ,
i j i j s p q . The following hold for every (i, j): (1 ) , ,..., , ,
(1 ) ... gives the steady-state probabilities for our Markov chain C. For q < p we get that the probability e(p, q) of the buffer to be empty (i.e., the 1 st component of V B ) tends to zero as B → ∞, so by (2) we get s(p, q) → q = min{p, q}. Symmetrically for p < q we get s(p, q) → p = min{p, q}.
